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ABSTRACT 
Measures of pilot situation awareness (SA) are needed in order to know whether new 
concepts in display design help pilots keep track of rapidly changing tactical situations. 
In order to measure SA, a theory of situation assessment is needed. In this paper, I 
summarize such a theory encompassing both a definition of SA and a model of situation 
assessment. SA is defined as the pilot's knowledge about a zone of interest at a given 
level of abstraction. Pilots develop this knowledge by sampling data from the environment 
and matching the sampled data to knowledge structures stored in long-term memory. Matched 
knowledge structures then provide the pilot's assessment of the situation and serve to 
guide his attention. A number of cognitive biases that result from the knowledge matching 
process are discussed, as are implications for partial report measures of situation 
awareness. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the intense stress of combat, 
military pilots will need to keep track of a 
rapidly evolving tactical situation. Helping 
the pilot to maintain his knowledge of the 
situation from moment to moment, referred to as 
situation awareness (SA), has become a matter 
of considerable interest. Measures of pilot SA 
are needed in order to know whether new 
concepts in avionics and display design improve 
SA o r  not, but psychologists are only now 
beginning to explore whether and how SA can be 
measured. Two fundamental questions must be 
answered before appropriate measures can be 
developed: precisely what is situation 
awareness, and how do pilots maintain it. A 
clear definition of SA is needed because we do 
not know what to measure otherwise. A model of 
how pilots maintain SA is needed in order to 
suggest what kinds of measures will target SA 
and what kinds will miss the target all 
together. 
In this paper, I will summarize a theory 
of situation assessment encompassing a 
definition of SA and a model of how SA is 
maintained. In the course of this summary, I 
will show how the theory accounts for certain 
well-known biases in human cognition. 
WHAT IS SITUATION AWARENESS? 
In order to define situation awareness, 
one should first define what a situation is. 
In this paper, I define a situation to be a set 
of processes that control events in the 
environment. At any given moment in time, 
objects in the environment will be in 
particular states and at particular spatial 
locations, but these states and locations are 
constantly changing. Therefore, while 
momentary states of objects are critical to 
defining a given situation, those states are 
secondary to the processes that control them. 
Further, processes in the environment may 
themselves arise from higher order factors. In 
combat, for example, there will exist at least 
two opposing forces, each of which has its own 
set of goals. I n  order to achieve those goals, 
each force will have organized itself in a 
certain way and will have assigned certain 
functions to various members of the resulting 
organization. The processes of combat then 
arise from the interactions of functions 
between the two opposing forces. 
A situation, then, can be defined at 
various levels of abstraction. A the highest 
level, the situation may be defined in terms of 
the goals of the human participants. At the 
lowest level, the situation may be defined in 
terms of the momentary states of objects in the 
environment. In between these two extremes, 
the situation may be defined in terms of the 
organizations, functions, or  processes that 
translate goals into states. 
Situation awareness, therefore, can be 
defined partly as the knowledge that results 
when attention is allocated to the environment 
at one o r  more levels of abstraction. Of 
course, one could also allocate attention to a 
particular area within the environment--what 
Endsley (1988) calls a "zone of interest". 
Endsley (1988) has defined zones of interest as 
concentric volumes of space surrounding the 
pilot throughout which he distributes his 
attention. But these zones need not be 
spatially defined. For example, the pilot's 
own aircraft could define one zone, his own 
flight could define a larger zone, and the 
overall battle may define yet a larger zone. 
Thus, situation awareness should more properly 
be said t o  result from the allocation of 
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A blODEL OF S ITllATTON ASSESSFIEN? 
Defining situation awareness determines 
what is to he measured hut does not suggest & 
it should he measured. For this latter 
purpose, a model of situation assessment is 
needed. Ideally, such a model will indicate 
what kinds of measurement operations will 
target SA and what kinds will miss the target 
altogether. 
Some models of situation assessment stress 
that pilots develop and maintain a mental 
representation of the situation in working 
memory (Endsley, 1988). Because SA is 
maintained in working memory, these models 
predict that pilot SA should improve as the 
pilot's working memory capacity increases. 
Wickens, Stokes, Barnett, and Davis (1987) have 
recently provided evidence in support of this 
prediction. But a strictly increasing 
monotonic relation between working memory 
capacity and the quality of SA is expected only 
if all critical information about the situation 
must be represented in working memory at all 
times. This condition would exist only if the 
environment were the pilot's only source of 
information. But many theorists propose that 
recognized patterns among incoming sensory data 
may identify knowledge structures stored in 
long-term memory and that these identified 
structures are also a source of knowledge about 
the situation (Anderson, 1983; Rumelhart, 1984; 
Shank, 1982; Wyer & Srull, 1986). The 
knowledge structures in long-term memory go by 
different names, depending upon the theorist: 
associative networks (Anderson, 1983). memory 
organization packets (Shank, 1982), referent 
bins (Wyer & Srull, 1986), or schemata 
(Rumelhart, 1984). 
If schemata can provide substantial 
information about a situation, then the pilot 
need not attend to every detail of the 
environment in order to have a reasonably 
complete assessment of the situation. Rather, 
he needs to have schemata that accurately fill 
in many of the details, and he needs to 
recognize patterns in the incoming sensory data 
adequate to identify these schemata. Once a 
schema has been identified, the pilot needs 
only to search the schema for items of 
information not currently in working memory. 
b'lieii ;in appropriate schema is i io t  found i n  
Ioiig-Lclrrn memory, then the p i l o t  must resort to 
a hackiip procedure t h a t  greatly increases the 
load on workj ng memory. T h i s  backup procedure 
has b e e n  described by Wyer and S r u l l  (1986). 
lkscritially, the pilot must attend to a larger 
amount of information in the environment, 
identify multiple schemata that may be 
appropriate, j)lace information from these 
several schemata into working memory, and then 
integrate the information into a single result. 
This model of situation assessment 
predicts that the relationship between working 
memory capacity and quality of SA is dependent 
on the completeness of the knowledge the pilot 
has stored in long-term memory. If that 
knowledge is sufficiently complete with respect 
to a particular focal region, then the quality 
of SA should be less sensitive to working 
memory capacity. This dependence on long-term 
memory suggests that working memory capacity 
should have a greater impact on the SA of 
novice pilots than of highly trained expert 
pilots. 
THE MODEL IN OPERATION: 
COGNITIVE BIASES IN SITUATION ASSESSMENT 
Although schemata can facilitate situation 
assessment and relieve the load on working 
memory, they can also lead to biases that 
degrade the quality of situation assessment. 
These biases are representativeness, 
availability, the confirmation bias, cue 
salience, and the "as if" heuristic (see 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Wickens, 
1984; Wickens et al., 1987). These heuristics 
and biases can be divided into two groups: 
those that operate when incoming data match 
some schema, and those that operate when no 
match is found. Representativeness, 
availability, and the confirmation bias belong 
to the first group and are natural consequences 
of the situation assessment model. Cue 
salience and the "as if" heuristic belong to 
the second group and result from the demands of 
the backup assessment process on limited 
working memory and attentional resources. 
"Representativeness" is defined in 
Kahneman et al. as the process of matching the 
pattern of incoming data with a typical pattern 
for a particular situation stored in long-term 
memory. Such a matching process is not a 
computational short-cut as it is sonetimes said 
to be (Wickens et al., 1988) but is instead the 
central mechanism of situation assessment. 
Nevertheless, that such pattern matches can 
sometimes lead to errors in assessment seems 
indisputable. 
One way such matches can go wrong is 
captured by the availability heuristic. 
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"Avai I w b i  1 i L y "  occurs when p i l o t s  select the 
most accessible schema rather than the "best" 
schema. Within the model, avai.labili.ty results 
when t w o  or more schemas identify themselves as 
matching in-coming data and the schema with the 
strongest level of activation provides the 
pilot with his situation assessment. 
Activation strength may be high for several 
reasons. One is that activation strength 
should increase as the goodness-of-fit between 
the data and the schema increases. Another is 
that a schema may have been primed by earlier 
events and so already have a high base-line 
level of activation. If so, then a partial 
match may result in a higher level of 
activation than that found in another, unprimed 
schema where the match was actually better. 
The confirmation bias is defined as the 
tendency to attend only to those sources of 
information that confirm our previous beliefs. 
In the present model, the confirmation bias 
results whenever a schema is activated. The 
schema directs the pilot's attention to those 
cues that are relevant assuming that the event 
represented by the schema is in fact in 
progress. When the correct schema has been 
activated, this attentional guidance is 
beneficial; but if an incorrect schema has been 
activated, then such guidance can lead to a 
cascade of assessment errors as one error leads 
to another. 
Cue salience results when activated 
schemata are not adequate to direct the pilot's 
attention or when working memory is too 
overloaded to retain the attentional guidance 
provided by a schema. In the absence of such 
attentional guidance, control of the pilot's 
attention is likely to shift to the external 
environment. The physical salience of 
environmental cues may then become the dominant 
factor guiding the pilot's allocation of 
attention (cf., Wallsten, 1980). 
The so-called "as-if" heuristic also comes 
into play in the absence of adequate schemata. 
When incoming data do not match a single 
schemata, then the data are broken down into 
subsets and these subsets are then matched to 
schemata. In the extreme case, each data item 
in the subset would be matched to a different 
schema, and the schemata would then serve only 
to interpret each individual item. The result 
is that information from multiple schemata will 
have to be integrated in order to provide a 
coherent assessment of the situation. In 
arriving at this assessment, the relative 
contribution of each item of information should 
be weighted so that it contributes to the 
assessment appropriately. But in the absence 
of a single schema to assign these weights, any 
weights assigned by the pilot would be 
arbitrary. Because the simplest set of 
arbitrary weights i s  the set in which all 
weights are equal, pilots weight each item of 
information equally. That is, pilots treat the 
information items "as if" each had the same 
weight. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL: 
MEASURING SITUATION AWARENESS 
An important aspect of the model is that 
once the pilot has achieved an assessment of 
the situation, that assessment is stored with 
the schema from which it was derived. If the 
assessment was integrated from information from 
multiple schemata, then a new schema is created 
and stored in long-term memory. At that point, 
the assessment may no longer be needed in 
working memory and so may be discarded (see 
Wyer & Srull, 1986, for a discussion of similar 
processes). This particular feature of the 
model has important implications for how SA can 
be measured, as will now be seen. 
Any direct measure of SA will determine 
what aspects of the situation the pilot has 
stored in either working or long-term memory. 
That is, one could ask the pilot for particular 
kinds of information and then see if he can 
provide them. Because situation assessments 
are stored in long-term memory once they have 
been reached, it will generally not be possible 
to tell whether the pilot provided the 
information from working or long-term memory. 
But because situation assessments may not be 
retained in working memory once they are no 
longer needed, it is safest to assume that 
information is provided from long-term memory. 
This assumption might seem to suggest that SA 
could be measured by having pilots recall the 
details of a mission after the mission had been 
completed, an approach advocated by Whitaker 
and Klein (1988) and Kibby (1988). But data on 
serial position effects suggest that such an 
approach would measure pilot SA reliably only 
for events occurring late in the mission (see 
Tarpy & Mayer, 1978, f o r  a review). 
An alternative to post-mission recall is 
recall during the mission, an approach 
advocated by Endsley (1988) and Marshak, 
Kuperman, Ramsey, and Wilson (1987). At 
various points during the mission, the pilot i s  
asked to report on certain but not all aspects 
of the mission. For this reason, the approach 
may be called a partial report procedure. 
Asking the pilot to recall information about an 
event during the time that the event is taking 
place raises certain procedural difficulties. 
First, the pilot does not need to recall the 
information if it is currently available in the 
environment. Therefore, Endsley and Marshak et 
al. have suggested blanking all displays that 
might convey the information in question to the 
pilot. Such a procedure is impossible or at 
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least extremely dangerous in actual airborne 
missions and so is used only in simuLaLetl 
missions. Further, to ensure that responding 
to the memory probe does not interfere with the 
pilot's mission performance, the simulation is 
frozen for the probe and then resumed following 
the pilot's response. A number of practic.al 
issues raised by this procedure have been 
discussed by Endsley (1988) and need not be 
repeated here. 
A theoretical problem with the partial 
report procedure arises if recall is assumed to 
be from long-term memory. Essentially, the 
pilot has to search for the schema in which the 
relevant assessment was stored, and he has to 
base this search on the question that was 
asked. Suppose that the pilot is asked to 
report the spatial location of a particular 
enemy aircraft. Now imagine that when the 
location of that aircraft was noticed, the 
pilot was trying to determine that aircraft's 
objectives. Then, the aircraft's location will 
be stored with a "mission objectives" schema. 
But the question does not ask for the aircraft 
objectives, and so the pilot will not search 
for an objectives schema. As a result, the 
pilot may be unable to retrieve the aircraft's 
location even though he noticed and stored it. 
This theoretical difficulty may not discredit 
the partial report procedure, h u t  it does 
suggest that care must be taken in constructing 
the questions that are to be asked. 
Finally, the model suggests that measuring 
the load on working memory imposed by situation 
assessment may be as important as measuring SA 
itself. If pilots attain adequate SA but only 
at the cost of a high load on working memory, 
then they would be vulnerable to "losing" their 
SA if the demands of the mission on working 
memory were to increase. One way to measure 
the load on working memory would he by means of 
a secondary memory span task. Such a task 
could easily be integrated into the partial 
report method of measuring SA. Performance on 
the memory span task in combination with the 
partial report measure would then provide a 
measure of the pilot's SA and what it cost him 
to attain it. 
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